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Abstract The concept Bunanticipated consequences,^ coined by Robert K. Merton
(1936), has largely been replaced in current social science by its putative synonym,
Bunintended consequences.^ This conflation suggests that Bunintended^ conse-
quences are also Bunanticipated,^ effectively obscuring an interesting and real
category of phenomena—consequences that are both unintended and anticipat-
ed—that warrant separate attention. The first part of this article traces the conflation
of Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated,^ and explains why it occurred. The second part
argues the need for a clear distinction between what is unintended and what is
unanticipated, and it illustrates the failure of the present concept of Bunintended
consequences^ to do so and the consequences that has for social and political
analysis.
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BUnintended consequences^ remain a preoccupation in the social sciences, with its
annals containing an ever-expanding collection of examples on the unwelcome side-
effects of policy.1 This article does not add to this collection but seeks to narrow it by
questioning the pervasive conflation of Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated^ conse-
quences, a habit that stems from mixing up two theoretical traditions: that of
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Bunintended consequences^ from the spontaneous order literature and that of
Bunanticipated consequences^ following Merton (1936).2 These traditions, while close-
ly related, are not the same. Conflating their main ideas, I argue, subverts precision and
hinders our understanding of consequences that while unintended are not unanticipated.
The idea that individual self-interested acts can produce benign aggregate outcomes
that were neither intended nor foreseen is central to the spontaneous order tradition.3
Carl Menger, its main nineteenth-century representative, observed:
Institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its
development . . . come about as the unintended result of individual human efforts
(pursuing individual interests) without a common will directed toward their
establishment. (1985 [1883], pp. 146, 133)
Merton’s 1936 article BUnanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action^
builds on this tradition, but with an important difference. Merton was interested in the
consequences of Bformally organized^ action, not the unorganized actions of
Bindividuals considered distributively^ (1936, p. 896). BUnanticipated consequences,^
Merton writes,
may, of course, follow both [unorganized and organized] action, though the
second type would seem to afford a better opportunity for sociological analysis
since the very process of formal organization ordinarily involves an explicit
statement of purpose and procedure. (Merton 1936, p. 896)
The literature on unintended consequences following Merton (1936) agrees, with
most authors focusing on the unintended consequences of organized action, meaning
the unwelcome outcomes of formal policy.
The distinction is important because the failure to anticipate outcomes is far from
self-evident in organized action, whereas in a spontaneous order—the aggregate
outcome of numerous unorganized individual actions—lack of anticipation is a given.
4 Anticipating the outcomes of purposive action is the core business of policy makers.
They frequently fail, of course, and Merton aims to explain why. Still, I argue, policy
makers foresee more than we give them credit for. 5 Merton’s choice of terms
2 The term Bspontaneous order^ was coined by Polanyi (1951) and later adopted by Hayek (1982). It refers to
the classic problem of social phenomena that are Bthe result of human action, but not the execution of any
human design,^ in Adam Ferguson’s seminal phrase (1995 [1767], p. 205). Spontaneous order was a central
concern of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century Austrian School of
Economics. See Barry (1982) for an instructive account.
3 As Adam Smith famously phrased it: BThe rich, . . . in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though
they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the
thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, . . . are led by an
invisible hand to, . . . without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford
means to the multiplication of the species^ (1982 [1759], pp. 184–185).
4 BEvery step and every movement of the multitude . . . are made with equal blindness to the future^ (Ferguson
1995 [1767], p. 119). See also Hayek (1982, pp. 35–52).
5 Cf. Hirschman: BI intend to raise some doubts about [perverse effects] occurring with the frequency that is
claimed. . . . Policy making is a repetitive, incremental activity . . . so that tendencies toward perversity stand a
good chance of being detected and corrected^ (1991, pp. 38, 42). This article adds another option: perverse
effects also stand a good chance of being detected, even anticipated, without being corrected.
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(Bunanticipated^ rather than Bunintended^) was by no means arbitrary; it clearly
distinguishes unanticipated consequences from, say, those that are unintended but
anticipated. Unfortunately this clarity was obscured by the later conflation of
Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated^—a development to which Merton himself
contributed.
Disappearance of the unanticipated
While Merton’s 1936 article only referred to Bunanticipated consequences,^ Social
Theory and Social Structure (1968) used Bunintended consequences^ and
Bunanticipated consequences^ as synonyms. While both were common terms in social
science publications in the 1950s, references to Bunintended consequences^ began to
outnumber Bunanticipated consequences^ in the early 1960s. As the Ngram6 below
shows, Bunintended consequences^ is today the standard term while Bunanticipated
consequences^ has all but fallen out of use.
Google Scholar confirms the picture, generating 110,000 hits for Bunintended
consequences^ and 15,100 for Bunanticipated consequences.^ Google Web likewise
yields 5,880,000 hits for Bunintended consequences^ and 147,000 for Bunanticipated
consequences.^
Does the declining use of Bunanticipated consequences^ reflect a change in the
real world? Or has it simply been replaced by Bunintended consequences^ as a
synonym? A change in the real world would imply that our ability to anticipate the
effects of purposive social action has improved over time. To some extent this is
true. Policy makers now have more facts and theories at their disposal while the
unintended consequences of policy are a widely recognized problem. Strategies
6 An Ngram pictures the frequency, over time, with which terms appear in Google books, a database including
5.2 million books.
Source: based on data from Google Ngram
Fig. 1 Unintended consequences and unanticipated consequences 1940–2008. Source: based on data from
Google Ngram
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for avoiding unintended consequences are standard fare in management hand-
books and manuals while public administration schools teach the Bscience of
muddling through^ (Lindblom 1959). While Merton’s pioneering work on unan-
ticipated consequences (1936) placed the issue on the agenda, it became a self-
defeating prophecy.
If greater awareness among policy makers explains the decline in references
to unanticipated consequences, how should we understand the simultaneous
increase in references to unintended consequences? If unintended effects are
anticipated, they are a different phenomenon as they follow from purposive
choice and not, like unanticipated effects, from ignorance, error, or ideological
blindness (Merton 1936). Which of these do we mean when we call something
an unintended consequence?
The literature is far from clear on this point, with some authors stressing the
difference between unintended and unanticipated effects. Whereas Giddens’s def-
inition of unintended consequences as Bconsequences which result from behavior
initiated for other purposes^ (1993, p. 765) clearly distinguishes between the two,7
most authors gloss over the issue and use Bunintended^ as a synonym for
Bunanticipated.^ The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, for instance, notes that
B[f] unctionalists distinguish between Bmanifest consequences that are anticipated
and latent consequences (or unintended consequences) that are not^ (Johnson
1995, p. 117). The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, under the section-heading
Bunintended or unanticipated consequences,^ says: Bthe theme of the unintended
consequences of action . . . has [a] large pedigree in the social sciences [because]
things do not always turn out as we expect^ (Scott and Marshall 1998, p. 680; cf.
Marshall 1998). In Wikipedia we read that in the social sciences, Bunintended
consequences (sometimes unanticipated consequences or unforeseen conse-
quences) are outcomes that are not the outcomes intended by a purposeful action
[sic].^ The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics tells us that Bthe law of unintend-
ed consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions of people—and
especially of government—always have effects that are unanticipated or
unintended^ (Norton 2008).
Unanticipated consequences, so it seems, are disappearing from the literature be-
cause they are being called by another name: Bunintended consequences.^ The two
have been mistakenly conflated. True, unanticipated consequences can only be unin-
tended, but unintended consequences can be either anticipated or unanticipated, a
distinction lost in the single opposition of Bintended^ versus Bunintended.^8 Table 1
illustrates:
The left bottom cell is empty because what is intended cannot be unanticipated, and
vice versa. Intended consequences can only be anticipated (A). But unintended conse-
quences can be either anticipated or unanticipated (B or D).
The focus when theorizing unintended consequences has been on A and D. A
represents the rational ideal—purposive action realizes intentions; D is the realm of
7 See also Boudon (1982, p. 8); Giddens (1977, pp. 107–108); Perri 6 (2010); Sen (1999, p. 257).
8 Huntington notes a similar problem with the modern-traditional dichotomy. He cautions that oppositions
between positive concepts (Bmodern^) and residual ones (Btraditional^) are Bdangerous analytically [because]
they obfuscate the diversity which may exist in the residual phenomenon^ (1971, p. 294). BUnintended
consequences^ is one such residual concept.
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unexpected outcomes, the core subject of the social sciences according to many.9 Our
concern here is B, unintended but anticipated outcomes. Like D (unintended and
unanticipated), B consists of Bthings nobody wants,^10 but unlike D, things under B
are foreseen. Category B effects are real and common, and, as noted, in need of
separate attention. An obvious example is the unwelcome side effects of medicine.
Doctors who prescribe a drug do not intend to produce side effects—they intend to
cure a disease or relieve pain—but anticipate them and weigh their harm against
intended benefits. Weighing intended and unintended effects may be a matter of
routine, as when prescribing medicines, but may also entail a choice with political
or moral significance as in certain policy decisions. The point is that conflating
unintended and unanticipated consequences obscures category B and with it the
choices that were made.
Consider the following contribution to the International Encyclopedia of Political
Science (2011) on Bperformance management^:
In the performance management debate, warnings are given about the dysfunc-
tions and unintended consequences of performance management practices that
may result in a decline rather than an improvement in the performance of
organizations. . . . Such effects may include . . . growth of internal bureaucracy
. . . lack of innovation, . . . tunnel vision, [and] measure fixation (Salminen 2011,
p. 1855).
Conventional usage suggests that Bunintended consequences^ are unanticipat-
ed. But the unwelcome effects listed above are hardly surprising, with ample
documentation of bureaucratization, tunnel vision, and measure fixation in the
handbooks and academic literature on performance management.11 Anticipating
these unintended consequences is not beyond the ability of an educated perfor-
mance manager; to assume that they are unforeseen indeed seems naive. They
are more likely unintended but anticipated consequences, unwelcome side
effects that were foreseen but traded-off against intended consequences—effi-
ciency gains—and thus accepted.
9 For instance, Hayek (1982, pp. 20, 37); Menger (1985, p. 146); Merton (1968, p. 120); Portes (1999).
10 Karl Popper wrote in 1963: BPeople who approach the social sciences with a ready-made conspiracy theory
thereby deny themselves the possibility of ever understanding what the task of the social sciences is, for they
assume that we can explain practically everything in society by asking who wanted it, whereas the real task of
the social sciences is to explain those things which nobody wants^ (1963, pp. 124–125).
11 Merton’s theory of Bgoal displacement^ (1940) mentions them all. See also Gouldner (1954) and
numerous critiques of Bnew public management,^ e.g., Bouckaert and Balk (1991); Van Thiel and
Leeuw (2002).
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While this hypothesis would require testing case by case, the basic point remains:
the current standard usage of Bunintended consequences^ with its suggestion of
Bunanticipated^ encourages us to overlook the issue. Before pursuing this point, we
first examine how and why the two concepts were conflated.
Survival of the unintended
While Merton’s seminal article BUnanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social
Action^ (1936) strictly focused on Bunforeseen^ effects (1936, p. 895),12 Merton in
Social Theory and Social Structure (1968) uses Bunintended consequences^ and
Bunanticipated consequences^ as synonyms.13 Here is a familiar example:
The distinctive contributions of the sociologist are found primarily in the study of
unintended consequences (among which are latent functions) of social practices,
as well as in the study of anticipated consequences (among which are manifest
functions). (1968, p. 120)
The above passage and those cited below have contributed much to establishing the
use of Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated^ as synonyms. Social Theory and Social
Structure is one of the most cited studies in social science (and these are some of its
most cited passages), while the vast literature ensuing from this study has reproduced
the habit.14 It is no coincidence that the rise in references to Bunintended consequences^
shown in Fig. 1 began shortly after 1957 when the revised (and most quoted) edition of
Social Theory and Social Structure was published.
Why did Merton not stick to Bunanticipated^ consequences as he did in 1936?
Why muddy the issue by referring to Bunintended^ consequences, which are not
the same thing? The reason is that Merton in Social Theory and Social Structure
(1968) uses his ideas about Bunanticipated consequences^ to foster functionalist
explanation, and in doing so takes a radical step away from the 1936 article.15 In
1936 Merton explained unanticipated consequences of purposive behavior; in
1968 he switches explanans and explanandum and explains behavior by its
consequences (cf. Elster 1990, pp. 131–132). Intended consequences become
Bmanifest functions^ and unintended consequences become Blatent functions^
(1968, pp. 114–118):
12 The term Bunintended consequences^ appears once in this article, casually, when Merton notes the difficulty
Bof discriminating between rationalization and truth in those cases where apparently unintended consequences
are post facto declared to have been intended^ (Merton 1936, p. 897).
13 BUnintended consequences^ does not appear in the index of Social Theory and Social Structure, though in
the text it is used as a synonym for Bunanticipated consequences.^
14 A telling example is Tilly and Goodin (2006) who refer to Merton’s 1936 article as BThe Unintended [sic]
Consequences of Purposive Social Action^ (2006, pp. 22, 30). Commenting on this mistake, Marcel van der
Linden (2010, p. 282 fn.) notes that B[e]ven the best of us sometimes lose sight of the difference [between
unintended and unanticipated consequences].^ Although he is obviously right, it should be noted that the
source of this conflation is Merton himself.
15 According to Arnold Zingerle, Merton’s argument of 1936 has all the traits of a Bprefunctionalist action-
theory design,^ which is why in the decades after mainstream social science with its Bcollectivist orientation in
theory^ lost sight of it (1998, p. 178, see also note 19 below).
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This is the rationale for the distinction between manifest functions and latent
functions; the first referring to those objective consequences for a specified unit. .
. which contribute to its adjustment and adaptation and were so intended; the
second referring to unintended and unrecognized consequences of the same order.
(1968, p. 117)
Both types of functions can explain behavior, but latent functions explain
behavior irrespective of the intentions of the actor.16 In other words, whether or
not they intend it, people act in certain ways because those acts contribute to the
persistence of a larger structure. 17 The distinction between manifest and latent
functions rests on the presence or absence of actors’ intentions. This is why
Merton used Bunintended^ instead of Bunanticipated consequences^—to accentu-
ate the crux of latent function explanation. Merton’s use of the two concepts as
synonyms then became standard usage, living on long after functionalism’s fall
into obsolescence. Numerous critiques have pointed out that latent function
explanations are teleological as they fail to provide mechanisms of selection or
reinforcement (Elster 1989, pp. 98–100). But this critique applies unevenly to
Merton’s main examples. His latent function explanation of the Hopi rain dance is
teleological; his explanation of political machines is not.
The Hopi rain dance, Merton assumes, does not fulfill its manifest function of
causing rain. Thus the question is why it occurs at all. BIt may be found,^ he
suggests, Bthat the ceremonial does indeed have functions—but functions which
are non-purposed or latent. Ceremonials may fulfill the latent function of rein-
forcing the group identity^ (1968, pp. 118–119). But this does not suffice to
explain the occurrence of the rain dance. The dance might produce social cohesion
and indeed probably does. But if the Hopi do not intend or recognize this function,
it cannot explain their participation unless we provide a mechanism of selection or
reinforcement, which Merton does not. No Hopi informant who reports joining the
rain dance to reinforce group identity is ever mentioned. And if he were, the
function would cease to be latent as the behavior to be explained would no longer
be Bnon-purposed.^
Merton’s explanation of political machines, however, does provide a Bmechanism of
reinforcement.^ For Jon Elster, Merton is an exponent of the Main Functionalist
Paradigm, which yields teleological explanations because Bit postulates a purpose
without a purposive actor^ (1982, p. 454). Although Elster assumes that explanation
by function and explanation by purpose are mutually exclusive, Merton shows that this
is not the case. Merton explains political machines by the functions they fulfill for
individuals:
For . . . big business . . . the political boss serves the function of providing those
political privileges which entail immediate economic gains . . . . To those in need .
. . the machine . . . fulfills the important social function of humanizing and
16 Merton distinguishes latent functions to stress that motives and functions vary independently, and to
Bpreclude the inadvertent confusion often found in sociological literature between conscious motivations for
social behavior and its objective consequences^ (1968, p. 114).
17 A Bgiven system^ or Bspecified unit,^ as in Merton (1968, p. 117), or a Bsocial whole^ in the structural-
functionalism of Parsons (1951) and Radcliffe-Brown (1952).
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personalizing all manner of assistance. . . . The distinctive function of the political
machine for their criminal, vice, and racket clientele is to enable them to operate .
. . without due interference from the government. (Merton 1968, pp. 129, 128,
134)
The mechanisms are clear: the political boss helps those who repay him with their
support; people support a boss who has something to offer. Both parties expect to gain
from the relationship, and as long as they do the machine persists. But explanation by
these functions for individuals would make no sense without purposive actors. After
all, the machine can be functional only for people who pursue some goal—such as
obtaining aid or protection. Merton’s explanation of political machines therefore
violates his own definition of latent functions as unintended and unrecognized; he
instead views latent functions as covert or tacit (not as unintended or unrecognized)
purposes.18
The specifics of this functionalist explanation of political machines were never
widely recognized (De Zwart 1994).19 When functionalism lost its appeal in the late
1970s, so did latent function explanation, now associated with the teleology of the rain
dance example. But the concept of Bunintended consequences^ did not disappear with
it. We should have either retired it as a functionalist holdover of the rain dance kind and
returned to the clearer concept of Bunanticipated consequences^ (which are
Bunintended^ by definition) or used it consistently with the qualification Banticipated^
(or not).
18 I elaborate on this in De Zwart (1994, pp. 182–185).
19 Campbell (1982) is an exception: He blames Merton’s functionalism not for its neglect of purposive actors,
but for its focus on that. Merton remains within the Blimited sphere of rational purposive action,^ he argues, to
the neglect of Bsubconscious intention,^ Bnon-rational action,^ and Bnonintentional subjective dispositions^
(1982, pp. 37, 35). To illustrate this point Campbell uses a cross-classification of Bintention^ and
Brecognition,^ somewhat alike to what we did above for Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated^ (ibid., pp.34-
35). Although I disagree with Campbell’s conclusion, I think he is right that Merton, in line with contemporary
action theory, equated action with purposive action. This may also explain why Merton removed Bpurposive^
from the title in a reprint (1976) of his 1936 article; Bpurposive action^ is a pleonasm.
Source: Based on data from Google Ngram  
Fig. 2 Unintended consequences, unanticipated consequences, and latent functions 1940–2008. Source:
Based on data from Google Ngram
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Merton himself did the latter. In an [relatively recent] autobiographical account of
his oeuvre (1998), he builds on his pre-functionalist (1936) argument, stressing the
unforeseen effects of purposive action. The article is brief on manifest and latent
functions, and refers to Bunintended consequences^ only as Bunintended and unantic-
ipated consequences^ (ibid., pp. 295, 296, 298). Moreover, Merton notes that most of
his work is Blinked with the core idea of unanticipated consequences, later differenti-
ated into unanticipated, unintended, and unrecognized consequences^ (ibid., p. 315).20
I doubt that Bdifferentiation^ is the right term here since the fate of these concepts was
conflation, not differentiation. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows that Bunintended consequences^
did not go the way of structural functionalism; rather, it was Bunanticipated
consequences^ that disappeared from the literature along with Blatent functions,^ while
the unqualified use of Bunintended consequences^ thrives.
Why was the clearest of these putative synonyms abandoned? One important reason,
it seems, is linguistic convenience. BUnintended^ has a rhetorical advantage over
Bunanticipated^ because it is semantically closer to Bunwanted^ and almost all studies
about Bunintended consequences^ today are about the unwanted side-effects of policy.21
Presumed ignorance
The standard meaning of Bunintended consequences^ today is unwelcome and unantic-
ipated policy outcomes. As such, it fits well within organization theory, which tends to
focus on organizational shortcomings rather than accomplishments (Stinchcombe 2001,
pp. 1–17). In light of well-established theories such as Bgoal displacement,^ Bgarbage-
can^ decision making, Binstitutionalization,^ Bisomorphism,^ Bbounded rationality,^ and
Bmuddling through,^ it is hardly surprising that failure to anticipate unwelcome conse-
quences is the rule rather than the exception in policy making. Students of bureaucracy
theory are well prepared to accept this. But what about unintended yet anticipated effects?
Consider this example: official statistics show that China’s overall sex ratio at birth
was 118 boys for 100 girls in 2010. BIf the trend continues,^ the director of National
Population and Family Planning Commission stated at a press conference,22 Bit will
jeopardize gender equality, development of girls, lawful interests and rights of women,
and the nation’s long-term development.^ The female population deficit is often
explained as an unintended consequence of China’s one-child policy (e.g., Shalev
2001; Ebenstein 2010; Legge and Zhao 2004). To assure male offspring under the
constraint of the one-child policy, households practice Bsex selection^ (Ebenstein 2010,
p. 5), which results in a national female population deficit. Sex selection is a household
20 Merton is unclear about the sequence of intellectual events. A few pages earlier he also remarks on Blater
differentiation,^ though the sequence is reversed: BFor the theme of unintended consequences—only later
differentiated from unanticipated and unrecognized consequences—had pervaded my doctoral dissertation^
(1998, p. 302).
21 Hirschman, who also identifies unintended with unanticipated consequences, says that once Adam Smith’s
concept of the BInvisible Hand . . . became famous and evolved into Bunanticipated^ or Bunintended^
consequences, it soon acquired negative connotation, as Bunintended easily slides over to undesired^
(Hirschman 1991, p. 38) In a footnote on the same page Hirschman adds that BThis shift of meaning took
place in spite of Robert Merton’s warning that ‘unforeseen consequences should not be identified with
consequences which are necessarily undesirable.’^
22 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/16/c_131052436.htm (accessed August 23, 2013).
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choice for the lesser of two evils that produces unintended outcomes (cf. Aya 2006, p.
118). But what about anticipation? If we think of the deficit as resulting from a
multitude of household decisions, it is an Beffect of aggregation^ (Boudon 1982, pp.
139–140).23 There is no organization or design, only numerous separate households
who prefer sons over daughters and act accordingly. In this situation, lack of anticipa-
tion is more or less a given, as in the afore-mentioned spontaneous order tradition.
But if the female deficit is an unintended consequence of the one-child policy, we
invoke organized action and that changes the situational logic. The Chinese govern-
ment introduced the one-child policy to curb population growth; the female population
deficit is its unintended consequence. But lack of anticipation is hardly a given here.
Ebenstein concludes that Bencouraging or forcing people to change their fertility
behavior without addressing their fundamental preferences may have unanticipated
consequences^ (2010, p. 31). 24 But why presume ignorance here? Governments
specialize in anticipation; is it really likely that the Chinese government was unaware
of the mechanism described above and did not foresee its consequences?
According to Greenhalgh (2008, pp. 267–268), makers of the one-child policy and
other government officials anticipated the female population deficit. But it did not keep
them from pursuing the policy. Instead they banned the issue of sex ratio imbalance
from public debate and stifled research on it. B[S]cholars were forbidden to address the
question of female infanticide or even the SRB [sex ratio at birth]^ (ibid., p. 267). But
Bparty propagandists were well aware of the possibility that . . . rural couples might
abandon or even kill their infant daughters^ (ibid., p. 356 fn.). Indeed cadres in rural
areas were instructed to teach gender equality and to urge the population to overcome
old ideas about the superiority of sons. China’s female population deficit, then, is better
characterized as an unintended but anticipated consequence.
Consider another example. Asari et al. (2008) write about what they see as one of the
major problems facing contemporary British society: Bthe failure to produce a discourse
that integrates various ethnic groups under the umbrella of a common British identity^
(2008, p. 1). The pursuit of multiculturalism, they write, Breinforces ethno-cultural
elements of identity. Indeed, the way multiculturalism has been implemented in Britain
has proven problematic, with the unintended consequence of causing segregation and
disunity^ (ibid., p. 13). Left unqualified, Bunintended^ in conventional usage suggests
lack of anticipation. But the risk of segregation has been a standard critique of
multiculturalism since its inception, a risk policy makers around the world are keenly
aware of (De Zwart 2000, 2005; Schraml 2011).25 Segregation is an unwelcome but
anticipated side effect: it is permitted because it is traded off against intended effects
such as managing immediate crises and promoting equal cultural recognition.26
23 Jon Elster’s account of flourishing banditry in traditional China is an example. Many poor families in traditional
China practiced female infanticide. The result was a surplus of boys and unmarried men who Bwere excellent
material for recruitment by bandits^ (1989, p. 97). Banditry prospered as an unintended consequence.
24 Ebenstein consistently uses Bunintended^ throughout the article but here, in the conclusion, shifts to
Bunanticipated^ as a synonym.
25 Policy makers here face Bthe dilemma of recognition^—wishing to mitigate group inequalities while
foreseeing that the policies required to do so will accentuate the very group differences that caused the
problem in the first place (De Zwart 2005, p. 137).
26 Koopmans (2010) rightly argues that cultural recognition—a normative reason for state-sponsored multi-
culturalism—entails Breal trade-offs with the goals of socio-economic participation and equality^ (2010, p.
22). But does the government need to be told it makes tradeoffs when it makes them deliberately?
292 Theor Soc (2015) 44:283–297
The analysis of unintended consequences in public sector reform, Guy Peters writes,
makes Breformers appear terribly naïve so that they would not understand just what
they are doing, but generally these reformers [simply have] to make difficult choices in
complex situations^ (2007, p. 23). What makes reformers appear naïve, I would add, is
the habit of using unintended as a synonym for unanticipated, whereas in reality
reformers must often make Bdifficult^ choices—difficult precisely because they foresee
unwelcome effects. Conflating Bunintended^ and Bunanticipated^ obscures this.
Why, then, does this conflation remain so pervasive? One reason is that all parties
involved in the analysis of unintended consequences benefit from it. Discovering and
exposing the unforeseen lends importance to the work of analysts.27 In their account of
popular explanations of world inequality, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) draw atten-
tion to Bthe ignorance hypothesis, which asserts that world inequality exists because we
or our rulers do not know how to make poor countries rich^ (2013, p. 63). This
hypothesis, they argue, Brules supreme among most economists and in Western policy
making circles^ (ibid.). One of its charms is that it promises a way out: if ignorance is
the cause of world inequality, more knowledge and good advice to policy makers can
solve the problem (ibid., p. 67). But the ignorance hypothesis is often wrong and highly
misleading, as Acemoglu and Robinson convincingly show (ibid., pp. 63–70).
BLeaders of African nations,^ for instance,
that have languished over the last half century under insecure property rights and
economic institutions, impoverishing much of their populations, did not allow
this to happen because they thought it was good economics [which would make
impoverishment an unintended and unanticipated consequence, FdZ]; they did so
because they could get away with it and enrich themselves at the expense of the
rest, or because they thought it was good politics, a way of keeping themselves in
power by buying the support of crucial groups or elites. (ibid., p. 66)
Rulers and policy reformers also benefit from conflating Bunintended^ and
Bunanticipated^ consequences because it helps them to shed responsibility and avoid
discussion about hurtful choices. Daniel Ellsberg’s (1972) famous critique of the
Bquagmire model,^ a popular explanation for America’s disastrous entanglement in
the Vietnam War, is a textbook example. The quagmire model, believed by most
Americans, holds that a
policy of ‘one more step’—each new step always promising the success which
the previous last step had also promised but had unaccountably failed to deliver . .
. lured the United States deeper into the morass. . . . We have achieved our present
entanglement not after due and deliberate consideration, but through a series of
small decisions; . . . each step led only to the next, until we find ourselves
entrapped in that nightmare of American strategist, a land war in Asia.
(Schlessinger [Jr. (1968)] in Ellsberg 1972, pp. 49–50)
27 As Baily Norwood notes: BEconomy professors love to make themselves look smart and policy makers
look stupid. Hence, we love the Law of Unintended Consequences.^ http://ageconseeds.blogspot.nl (accessed
August 16, 2013).
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This theory, Ellsberg notes, seemed plausible to so many because it Baccords with
the major, widespread presumption that the ‘nightmare’ outcome must have been
unforeseen even as a strong possibility by those who made the decisions leading
toward it; or else they would have drawn back, or at least warned the public of the
demands ahead^ (ibid., p. 50, italics in original). But Ellsberg’s research shows that
presumption entirely wrong; the quagmire model is a myth, or, in terms of this article,
the nightmare outcome may be unintended but it is not unanticipated. The Presidents
that made the decisions leading to the Bnightmare outcome^ did so after having been
told, in striking detail, by military and civilian specialists, what this outcome would be.
Rather than the US Government lacking foresight and consequently stumbling into
quicksand, Bone sees, repeatedly, a leader striding with his eyes open into what he sees
as quicksand, increasing his efforts and carrying his followers deeper in. Why?
Presumably, because he sees no alternative . . . or because the alternatives seem even
more threatening, worse in the short run^ (ibid., p. 79).
Unintended but anticipated outcomes often concern controversial and politically
sensitive issues, and the connotation of Bunanticipated^ that sticks to Bunintended^
makes it possible to expose, discuss, or correct such issues without imputing blame or
getting into painful discussions about responsibility. BLooking at where their policies
and tactics have brought us so far,^ Ellsberg writes, Bit is easy to understand why the
past four Presidents would want . . . to conceal and deprecate their own foreknowledge
and intentions. . . . Presidents and their partisans find comfort and political safety in the
quicksand image^ (ibid., pp. 127, 131).
The disentangling of unintended and unanticipated consequences foregrounds ques-
tions of justification and responsibility, illustrated by a debate among moral philoso-
phers on the Bdouble effect,^ or the foreseeable causation of harm. At issue is the
question of whether a person may Blicitly perform an action that he foresees will
produce a good effect and a bad effect^ (Mangan 1949, p. 43). The principle of double
effect—introduced by Thomas Aquinas to justify self-defense 28–provides a moral
justification for such acts if four conditions are met: B1. that the action in itself from
its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2. that the good effect and not the evil
effect be intended; 3. that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 4.
that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect^ (ibid.).
The principle of double effect is widely accepted as a moral guideline (Boyle
1980).29 A classic illustration condemns the terror bomber but condones the tactical
precision bomber, though both anticipate an equal number of civilian casualties. A
terror bomber aims at civilians to cause terror; civilian casualties result from his
intentions. The tactical bomber intends to take out enemy military targets; civilian
casualties are an unintended but anticipated side-effect. The principle of double
effect defines terror bombing as morally impermissible but permits tactical bombing.
30 Some authors, however, are skeptical about the moral significance of the
28 Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7). A speech of Osama Bin Laden apologizing to Sunni Muslims in
Iraq suggests that the principle’s moral appeal is not limited to the Christian world: BThe Muslim victims who
fall in operations against the infidel Crusaders or their usurper [Iraqi] agents are not the intended targets. . . .
We hold ourselves responsible and seek God’s forgiveness for that^ ([Bin Laden, quoted in Scheuer 2011, p.
5327).
29 See Krakauer et al. (2000) for examples in medical practice.
30 McIntyre (2011) discusses a range of other common applications of the principle.
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difference between what is intended and what is merely foreseen (McIntyre 2001,
2011); others doubt the extent to which the doctrine of double effect actually codifies
moral intuition (Otsuka 2008). As space does not allow more detailed discussion, I
mention this here to show that the distinction between intention and anticipation is
clearly a question in ethics. But in social science this distinction has been blurred
through conceptual conflation.
Conclusion
I have argued that the concept of Bunanticipated consequences^ has largely
disappeared from the literature because it has been replaced by its putative
synonym, Bunintended consequences.^ Merton himself invited this conflation
when he incorporated his own earlier thoughts on unanticipated consequences
in functionalist explanation. Although he later stressed the need to distinguish
these two concepts, he could not undo the lasting influence of his own earlier
work: Bunintended consequences^ has come to mean unforeseen side effects,
the study of which is often called the raison d’être of social science. However,
this conceptual conflation has rendered invisible another category of outcomes,
namely unintended but anticipated consequences. This category does not fit the
classic dichotomy between Bdesign^ and Bspontaneous growth^ because unin-
tended but anticipated consequences are neither designed nor generated sponta-
neously; they are better characterized as Bpermitted outcomes.^
Policy makers in the examples cited above anticipated unwelcome and
unintended consequences. That did not, however, keep them from pursuing
their plans. We cannot explain these outcomes as arising out of error, igno-
rance, or blindness as with conventional unintended consequences; the question
is not why policy makers failed to anticipate these effects but why, given the
foreseen risks, they chose to go ahead anyway. It may be that policy makers
are opting for the lesser of two evils, thinking that not acting is worse than
permitting the harm they foresee. It may be that they are indifferent to future
harm, or simply willing to gamble, hoping things will not turn out too badly.
But it may also be that the decisions that produced the unintended harm were
carefully weighed on a moral scale as in, for instance, Bprinciple of double
effect.^ The answer depends on the case at hand; the point here is that
recognizing unintended but anticipated consequences as a separate category that
represents this aspect of social reality can facilitate such research. Social
scientists, eager to speak truth to power, should consider the possibility that
those in power may know the truth, yet let bad things happen anyway because
they fear worse.
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